EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia - FT中文网
登录×
电子邮件/用户名
密码
记住我
请输入邮箱和密码进行绑定操作:
请输入手机号码,通过短信验证(目前仅支持中国大陆地区的手机号):
请您阅读我们的用户注册协议隐私权保护政策,点击下方按钮即视为您接受。
FT商学院

EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia

The bloc’s agreed partial embargo may prove to be ineffective as higher prices could compensate for reduced volumes

The aim of economic warfare is to inflict maximum pain at minimum cost. Achieving that is hard when the target is a key commodity producer. The EU’s agreement to ban most Russian oil imports reflects justified outrage at the barbaric invasion of Ukraine. But it may prove to be ineffective.

The problem with oil is that it is traded internationally. Higher prices may compensate Russia for reduced volumes, as US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen argued in April. Equally, customers in the EU and outside it may swap sources of supply in response to price signals, with little ultimate impact on the Russian exchequer.

The lower the level of substitution, the more powerful the partial embargo. Some countries, for example, lack refineries that can process Urals, Russia’s sulphurous main export blend.

That is not a problem for China and India. They have already moved to fill the gap in demand for Russian oil created by self-sanctioning by European refiners and traders. India rarely bought Russian oil in the past. But it emerged as the largest purchaser of Russian Urals crude in April, according to S&P Global.

Asian countries may not take up the full slack in demand for Russian oil, however, fearing retaliatory western sanctions. Capital Economics thinks Russia’s oil exports will fall by a fifth this year, even allowing for a 15 per cent rise in exports to non-western countries. But after factoring in higher prices, the consultancy estimates that Russia’s oil export revenues will be $180bn, a mere $2bn lower than in 2021.

The gap between Brent and Urals crude — currently $31 — may eventually fall in response to substitution. One response from the west may be to ban its insurers from covering tankers carrying Russian oil. Creating friction of a logistical kind is one way of compensating for a lack of it in markets.

Even after the oil embargo is fully phased in next year, it may be more than offset by higher gas prices. The oil embargo reduces Europe’s financial complicity. It will not, by itself, sabotage the Russian war machine.

版权声明:本文版权归FT中文网所有,未经允许任何单位或个人不得转载,复制或以任何其他方式使用本文全部或部分,侵权必究。

高通近日与英特尔接洽收购事宜

如果达成,这笔交易将是历史上最大的科技收购,目前还没有正式报价。

一周气候图表: 保险公司和政府计算洪灾成本,致命洪灾损失不断增加

欧洲洪灾后,布鲁塞尔承诺提供高达100亿欧元的赔偿,与此同时,保险公司面临估计30亿欧元的索赔。

乌尔苏拉•冯德莱恩:掌控布鲁塞尔的强势政治家

这位欧盟委员会主席将自己定位为这个问题的答案:“如果我想与欧洲对话,我该给谁打电话?”

英国和德国的失败方式不同

两种截然不同的治国方式现在同样不成功。

“大空头”基金经理艾斯曼因加沙言论被“无限期休假”

这位著名投资者在X上表示,他正在“庆祝”加沙的毁灭。

人工智能时代的战争需要新的武器

我们现在就必须发展我们所需要的东西,为将来的战斗做好准备。
设置字号×
最小
较小
默认
较大
最大
分享×