（三）长寿时代下日本的社会经济变化分析
(c) Analysis of socio-economic changes in Japan in the age of longevity
日本目前是全球人口老龄化最严重的国家之一，世界银行数据显示，2014年其65岁以上人口比重达到25%，可以说率先跨入长寿时代。长寿时代下的日本社会经济发生了深刻变化。我们根据前文提供的理论视角, 分析日本的变化，将会给未来的中国更加深入的启示。
Japan is currently one of the countries with the oldest population worldwide. World Bank data shows that in 2014, the elderly aged 65 years and above made up 25% of the population, making the country one of the first to enter the age of longevity. Japan’s society and economy have undergone profound changes in the age of longevity. On the basis of the theoretical perspective that we detailed above, we will now analyse the changes that Japan has undergone in order to provide a more in-depth insight into China’s future.
人口红利衰退，储蓄率降低，经济增长缓慢。第二次世界大战后至20世纪70年代日本经济进入高速增长时期。世界银行数据显示，1970年日本65岁及以上老龄人口占总人口的比重达到7%，社会开始正式步入老龄化。人口的拐点也标志着劳动密集型经济高速发展模式的结束。1994年日本老龄人口比重已达到14%，步入重度老龄化。与之对应的，20世纪90年代以来，日本经济总体走下坡路，长期处于低迷状态。这一期间，日本储蓄率与15~64岁人口占比在1991年左右同时到达高点，之后开始步入漫长的下降通道。储蓄的萎缩也带来日本投资的萎缩。日本投资增速在从90年代初也开始震荡下行，随后一直在0%附近徘徊。日本的利率也随之持续下行，甚至进入负利率时代，背后主要原因是资金的需求（投资）下降速度快于资金供给（储蓄）的下降速度。
The demographic dividend is fading, the savings rate is decreasing, and economic growth is sluggish. From the end of the Second World War until the 1970s, Japan underwent a period of rapid economic growth. World Bank data shows that in 1970, Japan’s elderly population aged 65 years and above accounted for 7% of the total population, after which its society formally began to age. This population inflection point also marked the end of the country’s labour-intensive development model, which once delivered rapid economic growth. By 1994, Japan’s elderly population accounted for 14% of the total, and the country entered a period of severe ageing. Correspondingly, the Japanese economy has generally declined since the 1990s, and has been in the doldrums for a long time now. During this period, Japan’s savings rate and the proportion of the population aged between 15-64 years both reached high points in around 1991, after which they began a slow downward trajectory. Shrinking savings also brought about a decline in Japan’s investment. Japan’s investment growth rate also began to fluctuate downward from the early 1990s onwards, and has since consistently hovered around 0%. Japan’s interest rates also continued to decline, even entering negative interest rate ranges. The main reason behind this is that demand for funds (investment) fell faster than the supply of funds (savings).
日本劳动生产率的增长放缓，技术替代加快。劳动生产率代表每单位有效劳动的平均产出，是决定一国经济是否具有未来增长性的标志性指标。日本劳动生产率增速在1970年后下行的趋势明显。劳动生产率来自三个方面，资本深化、劳动力素质、全要素生产率。资本深化即资本劳动比的提高。亚洲生产力组织（Asian Productivity Organization）的数据显示（见图6），近40年影响日本劳动生产率的三个要素都出现不同程度下降。资本替代方面，劳动力成本上升、数量短缺促使资本加大对劳动力的替代。但随着资本对劳动的边际替代率递减和投资的萎缩，资本深化近几年对劳动生产率甚至出现拖累。全要素生产率方面，老龄人口占比的增加刺激了技术替代，日本机器人和自动化等尖端技术高速发展。20世纪70~80年代日本全要素生产率强力支撑劳动生产率，但是泡沫破灭后这种支撑有所减弱。全要素生产率的逐步低迷也与长寿时代下日本社会阶层固化和家长式企业管理结构抑制创新有关。劳动力素质方面，世界领先的高等教育普及率使得日本人口素质整体较高，高素质劳动力成为对冲劳动生产率下行的重要因素。
Japan’s labour productivity growth has slowed, and technology substitution has accelerated. Labour productivity represents the average output per unit of effective labour, and is a landmark determinant of the future growth prospects of a country’s economy. The downward trend of Japan’s labour productivity after 1970 is all too obvious. Labour productivity comprises three aspects: capital deepening, the quality of the labour force, and total factor productivity. Capital deepening refers to increases in the capital-labour ratio. Asian Productivity Organization data (see Figure 6) indicates that over the last 40 years, these three factors influencing Japanese labour productivity have all decreased to varying degrees. In terms of capital substitution, rising labour costs and shortages have prompted capital to increase labour substitution. However, with a diminishing marginal replacement rate of capital for labour and shrinking investment, the deepening of capital has even dragged down labour productivity in recent years. In terms of total factor productivity, the increasing ageing of the population has stimulated technology substitution, and cutting edge technologies such as robotics and automation have developed rapidly in Japan. From the 1970s to the 1980s, Japan’s total factor productivity provided powerful support for labour productivity, but this support fell away following the bursting of the economic bubble. The gradual downturn in total factor productivity is also related to the social ossification of Japanese society in the age of longevity and the suppression of innovation by paternalistic corporate management structures. In terms of labour quality, the country’s world-leading higher education penetration rate ensured the high overall quality of Japan’s population, and this high-quality workforce has become a significant factor dampening the decline in labour productivity.
日本银发经济相关消费需求提升，但并未完全迎来长寿经济。长寿时代下消费是日本经济增长最重要的驱动力，日本内阁府数据显示，消费贡献了近60%的GDP。虽然日本人口总量近年出现缩减，但日本的消费总量整体呈稳定低速增长态势。日本社会与老年人相关的医疗保健、护理类消费支出在总消费中的占比逐渐提升。日本的老年人更多扮演消费者的角色，通过消耗性的消费推动经济进步。虽然日本也在适应老龄化的挑战，部分老年人退休后仍参与劳动力市场，但我们认为，其参与程度生产力规模和创造力还不足以使日本老年人成为生产者和创新者的角色，长寿经济还并未在日本完全实现。
Japan’s silver-haired economy related consumption demand has risen, but has yet to fully usher in a longevity economy. In the age of longevity, consumption is the most important force driving Japanese economic growth. Japanese Cabinet Office data shows that consumption contributes almost 60% of GDP. Although the country’s total population has shrunk in recent years, Japan’s overall consumption has shown stable, slow growth. Japanese society’s consumption of ageing-related healthcare and nursing has gradually increased its proportion of total consumption. In Japan, the elderly predominantly play a role as consumers, and promote economic progress through expendable consumption. Although Japan is also adapting to the challenges of ageing, and numbers of elderly people continue to participate in the labour market after retirement, we believe that the degree of participation and the scale of productivity and creativity remain too low to allow Japan’s elderly to become producers and innovators. The longevity economy has yet to come to full fruition in Japan.
老年贫困也加大了日本社会收入差距。随着“老龄少子化”现象加剧和医疗成本提升，日本的老年贫困问题日益突出（丁英顺，2017）。同时，劳动人口下降导致养老金缺口逐年扩大，对公共财政造成沉重压力。由于收入相对较低的老龄人口的比例不断提高，日本社会总体的收入差距呈扩大趋势。从反映收入分配差异程度的基尼系数来看（见图7），1985~2015年30年间，日本社会的基尼系数大幅上升。其他发达国家的数据也表明随着老龄化进程加深，社会的不平等程度将会加深。
Old-age poverty has also increased the income inequality in Japan. Exacerbated by the lower numbers of children to support elderly parents and the increase in medical costs, the issue of old-age poverty in Japan has become increasingly apparent (Ding Yingshun, 2017). At the same time, the decline in the labour force has led to a pension deficit which is widening year by year, and which has put heavy pressure on public finances. As the proportion of the elderly population with relatively low incomes continues to increase, the overall income inequality in Japanese society continues to expand. Judging from the Gini coefficient, which reflects the degree of deviation in income distribution (see Figure 7), the Gini coefficient of Japanese society has risen sharply in the 30 years between 1985 and 2015. Data for other developed nations also indicates that as the ageing process continues, the degree of social inequality will also worsen.
（四）对中国的启示
(d) Implications for China
1.通过教育提高人力资本，以抵消劳动力和生产率下降的影响
1. Improving human capital through education to offset the impact of declines in the labour force and productivity
与日本20世纪70年代相似，中国正处在经济结构转型的过程中，消费逐渐成为经济的驱动力，与之对应的，第三产业占GDP比上升，第二产业占比经历顶峰后下降。产业结构转型直接影响劳动力需求结构，以服务业为代表的第三产业的劳动力需求也相应增加。
In the same way as Japan in the 1970s, China is in the process of transforming its economic structure, and consumption is gradually becoming the driving force of the economy. Correspondingly, the ratio of tertiary industry to GDP has risen, while that of secondary industry is falling after peaking. The transformation of the industrial structure has had a direct impact on the labour demand structure, and labour demand from the tertiary industry, represented by the service industry, is also increasing correspondingly.
服务社会下，教育带来人力资本上升，可以抵消部分劳动力供给和劳动生产率下降的影响。不论是从个人收入还是从宏观经济角度，教育的投资回报率都极高（Psacharopoulos，1994）。教育是造成各国生产力差距的重要原因。劳动力受教育程度越高，生产力越发达（Mankiw et al，1992）。正如日本高素质劳动力是对冲劳动生产率下行的重要因素，教育红利对劳动力需求有较强的替代作用。长寿时代下的老龄人口占比提升对经济的负面影响主要集中在工业社会中，而通过投资教育提高人力资本，在服务社会下可以有效地抵消劳动力萎缩给经济带来的负面影响。
In a service society, education has brought about an increase in human capital to offset some of the impact of the decline in labour supply and labour productivity. Whether from a personal income or macro-economic perspective, the return on investment in education is extremely high (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Education is a major cause of productivity gaps between countries. The higher the level of education of the labour force, the higher the development of productivity (Mankiw et al., 1992). Just as Japan’s high-quality labour force is a significant factor dampening the decline in labour productivity, the education dividend plays a powerful substitution role for labour demand. In the age of longevity, the negative economic impact of an increase in the elderly proportion of the population is mostly concentrated in industrial society, whereas improvements in human capital through investment in education in a service society can effectively offset the negative impact of the contraction of the labour force on the economy.
2.加快技术替代，通过技术创新引导经济增长
2. Accelerating technology substitution, and guiding economic growth through technological innovation
自动化和机器人的应用将成为解决劳动力下降的重要手段。日本的例子中，自动化和机器人产业顺应着长寿时代蓬勃发展，许多行业加快了机器和技术替代人力。随着技术的不断发展，经济学家预言的机器人代替人工劳动的时代在不断逼近。世界银行的数据则显示，OECD国家中将有57%的工人的工作能被机器取代。从1993年到2007年，欧美已经投入经济生产的机器人增长了4倍，数量大概在150万~175万之间。波士顿咨询估计，这一数量在2025年将会增长至400万~600万。各行业使用机器人情况分别为：汽车行业使用了39%的机器人，居各行业之首；电子、金属、塑料化工行业分别为19%、9%和9%（Acemoglu and Restrepo，2017）。机器人替代传统人力，将提高生产效率，加速自动化及相关行业的发展，进而进一步引导创新促进经济增长。
The application of automation and robotics will become an important means for resolving the decline in the labour force. In the case of Japan, the automation and robotic industries are booming in the age of longevity, and many industries have accelerated the replacement of manpower with machinery and technology. As technology continues to develop, economists predict that an era in which robots replace human labour is approaching. World Bank data shows that in OECD countries, the tasks performed by 57% of employees can be done by machines. Between 1993 and 2007, the number of robots put into economic production in Europe and the US grew four-fold, totalling between 1.5 and 1.75 million units. Boston Consulting estimates that this number will grow to between 4 to 6 million by 2025. Robot use differs by industry: 39% of robots are used in the automotive industry, the highest of any industry; the figures for the electronics, metallurgical, and plastics and chemicals industries are 19%, 9% and 9% respectively (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017). The substitution of traditional manpower with robots will increase production efficiency, accelerate the development of automation and other associated industries, and show the way for further innovation to promote economic growth.
3.通过建设有效的资本市场提升第二次人口红利的效率
3. Improving the efficiency of the second demographic dividend by building effective capital markets
有效资本市场是释放第二次人口红利的最佳渠道。改革开放促进中国第一次人口红利释放。随着劳动力素质提高、社会公共环境改善，第二次人口红利机会窗口已经开启。第二次人口红利的条件要求更高，人均资本的提升要转化为经济增长，需要依赖外部的制度性建设，尤其是资本市场的建设。如果资本市场的市场化程度低，融资渠道单一，会造成融资成本高，资源难以有效分配。日本的例子显示，社会进入长寿时代也会直接影响利率及投资收益率。未来如果全球新兴市场都进入长寿时代，全球的资本市场和投资收益也必将进入新的均衡态。另一方面养老金资产规模持续增长使得获得高收益的难度增加。上述几重作用将挑战中国养老财富的长期投资收益率是否能持续显著超越通货膨胀，实现保值增值。因此中国的养老金投资机构需要重视权益资产配置，提升对资本市场直接融资水平。
Effective capital markets are the best channels for unleashing the benefits of the second demographic dividend. Reform and opening up promoted the release of China’s first demographic dividend. Improvements in labour force quality as well as in the social and public environments opened the window of opportunity for the second demographic dividend. The requirement for obtaining the second demographic dividend are even higher, because the transformation of the increase in per capita capital into economic growth is dependent on external institutional construction, and that of capital markets in particular. Excessively low marketisation of capital markets and unitary financing channels will result in high financing costs, and make the effective allocation of resources more difficult. The example of Japan shows that the entry of society into the age of longevity will also have a direct impact on interest rates and return on investment. In the future, if global emerging markets enter the age of longevity, global capital markets and returns on investment will certainly arrive a new equilibrium. On the other hand, the continued increase in the size of pension assets will make it harder to achieve high returns. The various roles mentioned above will challenge whether the long-term returns on investment on China’s old-age wealth will be able to continue to significantly surpass inflation, and whether pension wealth can achieve the preservation and appreciation of value. Therefore, China's pension investment institutions must pay attention to the allocation of equity assets, and improve the level of direct financing in the capital market.
4.引入长寿经济，创造第三次人口红利
4. Introducing the longevity economy and creating the third demographic dividend
引入长寿经济理念，让老年人“持续”生产和创新，创造属于他们自己的“第三次人口红利”，需要改变原有的受教育、工作、退休三段式的工业时代用工方式，需要运用新思路创造属于老年人的消费和生产方式。
Introducing the concept of the longevity economy, enabling the elderly to “sustainably” produce and innovate, and creating their own “third demographic dividend” will require changes to the original, three-phase industrial-era approach of education, work and retirement, and will require new lines of thinking to create means of consumption and production which belong to the elderly.
传统理论认为老龄化对经济的负面作用主要来自于劳动力短缺，对资源的消耗和阶级固化对创新的阻碍。长寿经济下，情况可能变化。首先劳动力短缺可以通过机器人和人工智能替代，同时受过良好教育的老龄人口有能力和意愿参与生产，某种程度上可以缓解传统劳动力下降的压力。另一方面老年人阅历、经验、学识丰富，可以增加智力要素的供给。其次资源的消耗可以通过发展新兴健康产业减少资源挤占。过往老龄化对投资的挤出作用主要来自医疗、护理等环节消耗资源。而这些部门是从急症诊疗角度提供产品，造成资源的浪费，甚至阻碍经济的增长。在认识到老人带病生存问题后，新的健康产业将以基础医疗和慢病管理为中心，这就减少了资源的挤占。最后创新的阻碍可能会在长寿经济新的组织形态下得到缓解。当全球步入长寿时代，在传统经济之外将产生围绕老龄人口的长寿经济，其范畴和结构、组织形态和生产方式都是新的，可视为社会经济的增量。在增量经济的影响下，不同年龄层人口的社会矛盾和冲突可能缓解。
Traditional theory believes that the negative effect of ageing on the economy is mainly attributable to labour shortages, crowding-out effect on investments, and class solidification which hinders innovation. In the longevity economy, this situation may change. First of all, labour shortages will be alleviated through its substitution with robots and artificial intelligence, while at the same time, the well-educated elderly population will be able and willing to participate in production, which will to a certain degree alleviate the pressure from the decline in the traditional labour force. On the other hand, the wealth of knowledge, experience and expertise of the elderly may also increase the supply of the intellectual factor. Secondly, through developing emerging health industries, elder consumption may take less resource. In the past, the crowding-out effect of ageing on investment was mainly due to the consumption of resources in medical treatment, nursing, and other areas. These provided products from an emergency diagnosis and treatment perspective, causing a waste of resources, and even hindering economic growth. As they become aware of the issue of the survival of the elderly with illness, these emerging health industries will focus on basic medical care and the management of chronic diseases, reducing resource consumption. Finally, obstacles to innovation may be eased under the new patterns of organisation in the longevity economy. As the world enters the age of longevity, in addition to the traditional economy, a longevity economy will emerge around the elderly population. Its scope and structure, organisation patterns and means of production will all be new, and should be seen as an increment to the social economy. Under the influence of this incremental economy, social contradictions and conflicts between different age segments of the population may ease.
在中国老龄人口占比持续提升的背景下，在需求侧，适应老年人需求的创新将在更大程度上拉动经济，比如无人驾驶、智能家居可能成为重要的产业；医养结合社区更好地满足老年人的生活需要，与之相关的养老产业链也将蓬勃发展。在供给侧，如何让老年人也能够“持续”生产，创造属于他们的“第三次人口红利”也值得探索。在长寿时代的主题下，长寿经济与科技将可能产生前所未有的生产方式。自动化与人工智能技术进一步对初级劳动力进行替代，信息化和互联网化强化智力要素供给，全新的经济形态、生产方式会出现，劳动生产率或将大幅提升。全新的生产需要的劳动力素质将不同于传统，对教育部门提出终身教育的需求，并促进劳动力市场在年龄结构上达到一个新的平衡。
In the context of a continuous increase in the elderly proportion of China’s population, on the demand side, innovations which meet the needs of the elderly will drive the economy to a much greater extent, and some, such as autonomous vehicle and smart homes, may become major industries. The medical and nursing communities will be better able to meet the daily living needs of the elderly, and the associated eldercare industrial chain will also flourish. On the supply side, it is worth exploring ways of enabling the elderly to “sustain” production, as well as to create their own “third demographic dividend”. Within the framework of the age of longevity, the longevity economy and technologies may likely bring about unprecedented means of production. Automation and artificial intelligence technologies will continue to replace the primary labour force, while informatisation and Internetisation will enhance the supply of intellectual-focused factors. All-new economic patterns and means of production will emerge, and labour productivity will improve sharply. The labour force quality required by this all-new production will differ from its traditional counterpart, and will require the education sector to offer lifelong learning, and encourage the labour market to achieve a new equilibrium within the age structure.
5.重塑政府职能，促进长寿时代下的社会公平
5. Reshaping government functions, and promoting social equity in the age of longevity
在长寿时代，社会面临的最大挑战是财富不平等加剧，以及与之伴生的健康不平等问题。如何确保低收入者也能保持健康长寿是政策制定者需要考虑的关键议题。日本相对完善的老龄人口社会保障体系固然可以借鉴，同时也要看到由于日本经济增长迟缓、快速老龄化使公共养老金支出不断上升，给政府造成沉重的财政压力，带来了政府债务风险（张士斌等，2012）。我们认为，政府更重要的职能是激发长寿时代的经济活力，促进个人在不同生命阶段的财富积累，如提高教育水平、倡导终身学习和职业教育、鼓励企业面向老龄人口创新、允许更灵活的就业形式和用工形式；同时提升基本医疗卫生服务水平，提升卫生服务的效益，满足多层次的医疗健康需求；在全面提高国民在人力资本和财富积累的基础上进行合理的再分配，缩小收入差距，提高弱势群体的生活质量和健康水平。
In the age of longevity, the most significant challenge facing society will be the exacerbation of wealth inequality, and the associated issue of inequality in health. Ensuring that low-income people are also able to maintain a healthy, lengthy life is a key issue that decision-makers must come to grips with. Japan’s relatively well-established social security system for its elderly population can certainly be used as a reference, but it must at the same time also be borne in mind that Japan’s slow pace of economic growth and its rapidly ageing population have caused public pension expenditures to rise on an ongoing basis, placing heavy financial pressure on the government, and bringing with it the risk of government debt (Zhang Shibin et al., 2012). We believe that the most important function of a government is to stimulate the economic vitality of the age of longevity, and encourage the accumulation of personal wealth over the different stages of their life, for example by improving education levels, advocating lifelong learning and professional education, encouraging companies to innovate for the elderly, and allowing more flexible employment and ways of working. At the same time, the levels of basic medical and healthcare services must be improved, and the effectiveness of healthcare services must be enhanced in order to meet medical and healthcare needs at multiple levels. A comprehensive improvement in the accumulation of human capital and wealth should form the basis for a rational redistribution thereof, so as to narrow the income gap, and improve the quality of life and levels of health of vulnerable groups.