{"text":[[{"start":5.2,"text":"Nato leaders will convene in Ankara for their annual summit this week praying that Donald Trump does no further damage to an alliance that has guaranteed peace in most of Europe since the second world war. Nato is both stronger than it was 18 months ago, when Trump returned as US president, and a lot weaker. "}],[{"start":23.4,"text":"It is in better shape because, thanks largely to Trump’s pressure, its non-US members together spent $139bn more in 2025 than 2024 and are investing in readiness and rearmament. It is beginning to learn lessons in innovation and adaptation from Ukraine’s doughty resistance to Russian aggression. Europeans are taking on more command roles even as the US military remains professional and fully engaged."}],[{"start":50.45,"text":"Nato is at the same time much weaker because confidence that the Trump administration would stand by its allies if they are attacked has cratered. It is not just that the White House does not regard Russia as a real threat to US security. It no longer seems to share the values of its partners, or even the very notion of partnership."}],[{"start":70.35,"text":"In theory, a grand transatlantic bargain is still possible: Europeans take over primary responsibility for conventional defence of Europe on an agreed and progressive timeline; the US maintains its nuclear umbrella. But who can say with any faith that Trump would risk, say, endangering Mar-a-Lago to save Warsaw? "}],[{"start":89.69999999999999,"text":"The US administration also seems to lack the discipline to come up with a burden-shifting plan. It prefers to play to the Maga crowd by berating European laggards. Defence secretary Pete Hegseth has threatened to withhold US dues to the Nato organisation and has suggested the US would adapt its force posture in Europe according to who spends what rather than according to military need. Such threats only further reduce the alliance’s unity and strength."}],[{"start":116.94999999999999,"text":"It is true that some allies are not pulling their weight. Germany and its Nordic and Baltic neighbours are spending heavily. France and Britain, having failed to make the necessary hard political choices, lack the resources for their military ambitions and a credible pathway to Nato’s defence spending target of 3.5 per cent of GDP. Their heft within the alliance is destined to shrink and the White House’s impatience is likely to grow. The danger is that the US hastily withdraws forces and assets from Europe, leaving capability gaps and letting Moscow think it has a window of opportunity to test the alliance’s unity to destruction."}],[{"start":156.25,"text":"To salvage the alliance, and there is no real alternative, Europeans need to take matters into their own hands. They should be more proactive in collectively reducing their dependency on intelligence and targeting, transport, air defence and the rest of the support backbone provided by the US military. Another round of common EU borrowing could be considered. Their weapons procurement remains too cumbersome and production constraints still need fixing. Ukraine can help. They also need to invest more quickly in priority equipment, such as air defence and long-range strike missiles, and increase the readiness of their forces. They should take over responsibility as far as possible from Americans in Nato’s planning and command structures."}],[{"start":200.15,"text":"These pressing issues are unlikely to get the attention they deserve at the Nato meeting in Turkey. It is shaping up to be another show designed to appeal to Trump’s vanity, touting big numbers about spending increases and European purchases of US weaponry. It cannot paper over the transatlantic rift. Europeans need to step up their own preparations for defending themselves with much less American help, and potentially without any at all."}],[{"start":234.35000000000002,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftcn.net.cn/album/a_1783305422_9550.mp3"}